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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                               
No. 07-1316
                               
JOHN WALLACE 
                                                      Appellant
v.
FEDERAL JUDGES OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, PHILADELPHIA;
STATE JUDGES OF COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PA; GRAPHIC
MANAGEMENT ASSOC.; and STEVENS & LEE 
                               
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 06-1649)
District Judge:  Honorable James T. Giles
                               
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 10, 2008
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 26, 2008)
                               
 OPINION
                               
PER CURIAM
John Wallace filed a civil rights action against the Judges of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (“federal judges”), the Judges of
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania (“state judges”), Graphic Management Assoc.
The complaint is only nominally against all of the judges in the Eastern District of1
Pennsylvania; it specifically names only Judges Weiner and Surrick.  The complaint also
recites grievances against several other entities and individuals, such as the
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, but these entities and individuals were
never served and never entered an appearance in the District Court.  Accordingly, they are
not parties in this matter.  
As Wallace proceeds pro se, he may not represent Margaret and may only assert2
claims brought in his own right.  See Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876 (3d
Cir. 1991).
2
(“GMA”), and the law firm of Stevens & Lee, for alleged fraud on the state and federal
courts.    Wallace brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the rule of Bivens1
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  
Appellant’s complaint arises out of unsuccessful state and federal lawsuits that his
wife Margaret brought in response to GMA’s termination of her employment in 2004.  2
The federal suit initially was assigned to the Honorable Charles Weiner, and then re-
assigned to the Honorable R. Barclay Surrick after Judge Weiner recused himself at
Margaret’s request.  The complaint specifies six alleged instances of fraud on the state
and/or federal courts: (1) Counsel for GMA, Attorney R. Michael Carr, not a defendant in
this action, allegedly substituted excerpts from the GMA Employee Handbook, which
falsely indicated to the Court that Margaret was aware of certain Handbook provisions
used to justify her termination; (2) Carr allegedly submitted a prior deposition transcript
in place of a subsequent deposition transcript without the Court’s knowledge or approval,
simply because the latter deposition contained testimony favorable to Margaret; (3) Carr
filed a motion to dismiss in which he allegedly claimed falsely that Margaret had not
3made out a prima facie case of employment discrimination or retaliation; (4) Carr filed a
summary judgment motion in which he allegedly claimed falsely that Margaret had no
cause of action, and that he quoted testimony from a deposition that the Court had ruled
should not be relied upon and omitted testimony favorable to Margaret; (5) Carr filed a
motion in limine to exclude evidence relating to Margaret’s termination, which “caused”
an adverse ruling by Judge Surrick; and (6) an unidentified male cashed Margaret’s
401(k) check.  See Compl., pp. 48-51.  Appellant asserts that Judge Weiner, who is now
deceased, and Judge Surrick both ignored and thereby acquiesced to frauds allegedly
perpetrated by Carr.  The District Court dismissed Wallace’s suit against the state and
federal judges under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Wallace appealed and sought entry of
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), which the District Court denied.  We dismissed the
appeal from that order for lack of jurisdiction.  GMA and the individual defendants then
moved to dismiss the complaint, and the District Court granted the motion.  Wallace
again appealed.  
We now have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a District Court’s
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) de novo.  Merle v. U.S., 351 F.3d 92, 94 (3d Cir.
2003).  The District Court correctly determined that judges enjoy absolute judicial
immunity for conduct pursuant to their role as judicial officers.  “A judge is absolutely
immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by
the commission of grave procedural errors.”  Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359
(1978).  Accordingly, the claims against Judges Weiner and Surrick, as well as the claims
Should Wallace continue to file lawsuits against immune or otherwise improper3
defendants, the District Court or we could enter an order restricting his filing of such
cases.  See Chipps v. U.S. Dist. Ct. M.D. Pa., 882 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1989).
In reaching this determination, we considered the motion for summary action filed4
by appellees Federal Judges as well as appellant’s brief.  We decline to take summary
action, proceeding instead under 3d Cir. LAR 34.1(a) (1997). 
4 
against the state court judges, were properly dismissed.
The District Court also correctly dismissed the complaint as to GMA and Stevens
& Lee.  Neither GMA nor Stevens & Lee are state or federal actors, nor does the act of
filing a pleading with a court transform a private actor into an entity acting under color of
state or federal law.  The complaint offers only conclusory allegations that GMA and
Stevens & Lee conspired with state and federal actors.  Accordingly, Wallace’s claims
against GMA and Stevens & Lee were properly dismissed.  Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d
452, 458 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 930 (1998) (“[M]ere allegations of joint
action or a conspiracy do not demonstrate that the defendants acted under color of state
law and are not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”).3
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.    4
